As evidence, the lawsuit cites unnamed “courageous whistleblowers” who allege that WhatsApp and Meta employees can request to view a user’s messages through a simple process, thus bypassing the app’s end-to-end encryption. “A worker need only send a ‘task’ (i.e., request via Meta’s internal system) to a Meta engineer with an explanation that they need access to WhatsApp messages for their job,” the lawsuit claims. “The Meta engineering team will then grant access – often without any scrutiny at all – and the worker’s workstation will then have a new window or widget available that can pull up any WhatsApp user’s messages based on the user’s User ID number, which is unique to a user but identical across all Meta products.”
“Once the Meta worker has this access, they can read users’ messages by opening the widget; no separate decryption step is required,” the 51-page complaint adds. “The WhatsApp messages appear in widgets commingled with widgets containing messages from unencrypted sources. Messages appear almost as soon as they are communicated – essentially, in real-time. Moreover, access is unlimited in temporal scope, with Meta workers able to access messages from the time users first activated their accounts, including those messages users believe they have deleted.” The lawsuit does not provide any technical details to back up the rather sensational claims.
WhatsApp client is closed source. Any claims around E2EE is pointless, since it’s impossible to verify.
It’s E2EE alright. Just, don’t ask what “ends” we’re talking about.
Their mouth and Zuckerberg’s ass
For Facebook it doesn’t matter if its e2e. They control the client on both sides. They can just let the client sent the clear text data to them.
TMBE
Trust me bro encryption
Any claims around E2EE is pointless, since it’s impossible to verify.
This is objectively false. Reverse engineering is a thing, as is packet inspection.
Reverse engineering is theoretically possible, but often very difficult in practice.
I’m not enough of an expert in cryptography to know for sure if packet inspection would allow you to tell if a ciphertext could be decrypted by a second “back door” key. My gut says it’s not possible, but I’d be happy to be proven wrong.
Hell, as far as I know, E2EE would be indistinguishable from client to server encryption, where the server can read everything without the need for a secret “backdoor key”. You can see that the channel is encrypted, but you can’t know who has the other key.
The easiest way to break E2EE is to copy your private key to Meta’s servers. It’s very easy to implement, and close to impossible to detect.
Now you just need Meta to allow you on their networks to inspect packets and reverse engineer their servers because as far as I know, WhatsApp messages are not P2P.
/edit I betcha $5 that the connection from client to server is TLS(https), good luck decrypting that to see what its payload is.
No it is not. Whatsapp gets several updates a month. How do you keep up with that rate?
Outside of open-source. That shit is usually illegal
It isn’t. Otherwise security research would never happen for proprietary software and services.
SureSure no white hat never been sued before
In the US, CFAA is so draconian that in certain aspects it can be very illegal to reverse engineer code behind explicit ToS which whatsapp make you agree through click-wrap agreement (meaning explicit I agree button press) upon installing the app. So Meta could easily sue you with very good chance of winning. I work in security and reverse engineer a lot of stuff but just because my company has lawyers that will protect me (also I’m not an american) but generally americans are super fucked here and there are many stories of people being sued and even imprisoned for breaking ToS.
Call me old fashioned but I really think that for real E2EE the vendor of the encryption and the vendor of the infrastructure should be two different entities.
For example PGP/GPG on <any mail provider>… great! Proton? Not great
Jabber/XMMP with e2ee encryption great! WhatsApp/Telegram/signal… less so (sure I take signal over the other two every day… but it’s enough to compromise a single entity for accessing the data)
Okay Old Fashioned, but doesn’t open source encryption audited by a third party solve this problem? Signal protocol for example? Also proton, I’m guessing, but I’m too lazy to check
Cynical me would say they don’t have to use the code they put up on GitHub in production.
By this logic, can we trust any open source software, even if they claim to use some third party encryption? They could say they’re using a super secure encryption, even show it implemented in their open source code base, then just put the other, secret evil backdoor code base in production? Is there a way for any open source project to prove that the code in their open source repo is the code in production?
This is called reproducible builds. With this all builds of a version will be binary-identical. So you can build from the repo and the compare it with the appstore binary and see if the owner was honest.
I found this:
https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Desktop/blob/main/reproducible-builds/README.md
Looks like they’re working on reproducibility, at least in the desktop app. That’s a little disappointing but i guess I’m happy they’re working on it.
Neat! And can this been done with signal or proton?
Signal: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/reproducible-builds/README.md
Proton: didn’t find anything (but I just did a quick lookup)
If you can self host it, yes. Like matrix
But only if you self-host right? Otherwise who ever hosts the matrix instance can tinker with it.
Correct.
In the end i have to choose between some shady company or some guy with a homelab. I guess I’ll choose the one who isn’t financially incentivized to screw me over.
Yep
Unfortunately even the best intentioned and best audited project can be compromised. So that is not a guarantee (sure, much better than closed source but that is a given)
You may be forced by a rubber hose attack (or legal one) to insert vulnerabilities in your code… and you have the traffic… a single point to attack… signal/proton/etc
Is it possible with two different vendors? Sure it is but it is way more complicated
That’s a really good point. All we’d need is for signal devs to be compromised in some way and the next update ends security for signal.
why
Not much people use clients anymore.
Yeah and I think it’s a pity. It’s the byproduct of “app culture” everything has to be easy. One button, plug and play…
Unfortunately like many things in life “saving” (time and effort n this case) has a cost
insert pikachushockedface
What?!! No. The owner of WhatsApp would never lie to us.
It would not be surprising if found to be true. Difficult to see how the current business model operates at a profit. Their long term goal is the usual loss leader model until a monopoly is achieved and then slug us with ads, sell all the data, hike the price, etc. Sickening to watch them cosy up to fascists. They are probably supplying any and all the agencies with intelligence scraped from their user base. If Facebook were a person they would be a psychopath.
If Facebook were a person they would be a psychopath.
I mean, Mark Zuckerberg kind of is Facebook, and he’s a psycho.
Obligatory
I would argue that the vast majority of users don’t use WhatsApp for privacy. In the UK at least, it’s just the app everyone has and it works. I’ve actively tried to move friends over to signal, to limited success, but honestly it can be escaped how encryption is not it’s killer IP.
Yup. I use Whatsapp to text my girlfriend and my work uses it as a group chat for road conditions or just shit talking.
If you’re using it for secure purposes, you’re part of the problem.
Im not a big fan of meta and WhatsApp, but these claims are a bit much. Any employee gets access to messages through a well documented internal process? “No separate decryption step is required” , so the WhatsApp CLIENT is not doing any actual e2e encryption and no attempt at reverse engineering or traffic analysis has ever seen that this is the case?
Where can one see, what these whistleblowers have actually published? I would expect to see this “simple process” and how that interface actually works… And I would expect any journalist to request some proof (show me the last message i sent to Alice) before trusting an anonymous whistleblower making such an extraordinary claim.
From what I heard so far, that anonymous whistleblower could be a troll or an ex-employee who just wants to cause some trouble for meta.
We should not trust anything blindly, even if it fits with our view of the world. Meta is an evil company, but as long as there is no indication for these specific allegations to be true, we should treat them as unfounded allegations.
In principle the messages themselves could be E2E encrypted, but the closed-source WhatsApp client could transmit decryption keys to Meta HQ without anyone finding out. As long as the client or the client device is unsafe and not trusted, E2EE is not really effective. Which is why one should always demand a FOSS client for E2EE.
Of course we shouldn’t trust anything blindly, but we also need to use common sense. Have we seen proof that what’s claimed to be true is in fact true? No. But it might be true, and it’s consistent with what Meta would do. So if your cautious minded, you should assume it’s true for now while you go through the next few years of your life waiting for discovery.
Ending encryption is Meta’s end so they can spy on everyone and help governments do so as well, so they therefore have an end to end encryption. Oh, y’all thought the app had true E2EE such that even Meta with their surveillance capitalist business model couldn’t access your data? 🤣
Even if that’s all true, it’s not evidence that the end to end encryption is broken.
That sort of debug access could simply be included in the clients.
I’m not sure if it’s the encryption part you don’t understand, the end to end, or both.
I understand perfectly well, it’s you who doesn’t.
If the illegitimate access happens on the client which is the endpoint of the e2e-encryption then it doesn’t say anything about the e2e-encryption working or not working. On the endpoint the content is always available decrypted, for user consumption
Ah, so you don’t understand what the word user means. Got it.
an end to end encryption implementation is broken when secret keys leak, whether its intentional or not.
Nowhere in the given scenario do secret keys leak.
The “encryption for two different receiving sides” part is the one that you, in turn, might have missed. WhatsApp client might just send messages to some additional technical party, which is not your buddy.
DUH
That’s just another comment
No if this is proven it would be a real scandal and would bring a lot of users to better alternatives.
If it’s false that’s good too, since then WA has e2e encryption
would bring a lot of users to better alternatives.
Most users of whatsapp don’t care about e2e. They hardly even know what it is.
Right. This place sometimes forget that we are tiny community of techies that hate the system. Makes me see this place as a bit of a circlejerk at times.
Yeah the venn diagram overlap of “people who understand and care about e2ee enough to drop a messaging app for not supporting it” and “people who use whatsapp” has to be a sliver
It must really be empty… Two contradictory assumptions lol
Not empty… It’s hard to embark all your family, relatives and friends on your journey to fucking basic privacy principles
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No but average people understand the concept of meta reading and accessing your private message. That would be a scandal and righly so
They don’t but they do know what “Any Meta employee, and every US government employees, can read all of your messages” means
Especially if they saw it now
They don’t know what e2e encryption is, but they sure as hell know what “employees have access to all your messages” means. Sure, it makes it harder for them to find a good alternative, but it will scare some away from Meta (unknown how many will actually care).
True. But some would care about broken promises
“Your messages are public and being read by silicon valley creeps”
That’s easy enough to understand.
It’s already a known risk, because WA uses centralized key management and servers, and always has regardless what Meta says. If you believe their bullshit, then I feel sad for you.
Also…you don’t think that LAWYERS willing to go up against Meta would have rock solid proof from these whistleblowers FIRST before filing a lawsuit?
C’mon now, buddy.
I’m surprised anyone is surprised. It’s been known since WhatsApp came out that it’s not true e2ee because meta holds your keys.
Well they did this whole stupid “rebranding” of it becoming e2e after Facebook bought them a few years back, but literally every security researchers was like “Nahhhh, pass”.
considering that you can decrypt facebook e2e encryption with a 6 digit security pin… yea Facebook at least has the private keys backed up server side.
I don’t use any Meta products, so not sure how you mean. If you are a user that has been sending e2e messages, then you can surely decrypt said messages if you’re a participant in those messages transactions.
So, with facebook if you lose your device, you can register a new device to the account and recover your messages using a 6 digit security pin or a recovery code.
This means that your messages are stored in decryptable format either via a private key being stored, or as a separate server encrypted form in a backup.
I just had to go through this with my grandfather a few months back.
Also…you don’t think that LAWYERS willing to go up against Meta would have rock solid proof from these whistleblowers FIRST before filing a lawsuit?
This is not how civil court works. It’s not trial by combat. There is no standard for the quality of lawsuits filed. And despite what the ambulance chasers say on TV, Layers get paid even when they loose.
“alleged in a lawsuit…” is the same level of credibility as “they out here saying…”.
It doesn’t matter if it’s criminal or civil. The costs to bring such a case are massive, and you’re leaving yourself open to a behemoth like Meta just dragging out the case for lengthy periods of time which drastically increase those costs.
No law firm files suit against a giant company like this unless they have rock solid proof they will, at the very least, land a settlement plus recuperation of costs. Just not a thing.
What do you want from me here?
Mark zuckerberg eats scandals for breakfast
Yes but Whatsapp has been pretty reliable and trustworthy for many people. No ads etc
we can’t lose!
People wouldnt move. They know its not secure and they dont care enough.
If it’s false
How would we know?
It would not. People don’t care. People don’t care that meta is an evil corp. Encryption is not even close to the top 10 reasons people use that app. It’s just a random word normal users throw around because marketing told them it’s good.
Normal users don’t talk about encryption at all but they somewhat trust WhatsApp
What are the better alternatives? because it seems like the comment section is flooded with people (yourself included) that don’t understand that most (probably all) e2e messaging apps are vulnerable to this attack as long as they trust a centralized server.
The issue isn’t an encryption one, it’s a trust one that requires you to trust the makers of the messaging app and the servers the apps connect to (and the method by which the app is distributed to you).
Signal uses reproducible builds for its Android client, and I think for desktop as well. That means it’s possible to verify that a particular Signal package is built from the open source Signal codebase. I don’t have to trust Signal because I can check or build it myself.
If I don’t have extreme security needs, I don’t even have to check. Signal has a high enough profile that I can be confident other people have checked, likely many other people who are more skilled at auditing cryptographic code than I am.
Trusting the server isn’t necessary because the encryption is applied by the sender’s client and removed by the recipient’s client.
likely many other people who are more skilled at auditing cryptographic code than I am
Maybe but that doesn’t mean you have the same app they do, Google may have different apks for people who could check it and for those who won’t.
There is a risk Google could tamper with the app for specific users if they’re installing it from Google Play. I think it’s likely security researchers would discover that if it was widespread, but there’s a chance Google could do it undetected if they targeted it selectively enough.
People who are concerned about this can download the APK directly from Signal and check its signature before installation.
Signal
You’re just replacing trust in Meta with trust in Signal Inc without understanding why WhatsApp is vulnerable to this.
Is Signal Inc more trustworthy than Meta? probably
is Signal (app) safe from the attack described? absolutely not.
Theoretically, you can check the code actually running on the Signal servers is the code they publish under a free and open source licence, using the hardware-based TEE attestations the servers will return
Someone more knowledgeable than me may have managed to do so, I haven’t.
Tell me you don’t understand how Signal’s E2E mechanism works without telling me you don’t understand how Signal’s E2E mechanism works.
Tell me you don’t understand what E2E encryption is without telling me you don’t understand that the limits of E2E encryption.
See every other comment in this thread describing in great detail why you are wrong, but that you fundamentally DO NOT UNDERSTAND how any of this works whatsoever.
You fundamentally DO NOT UNDERSTAND how security works, go play with your algorithms and stop spamming my replies.
Um, security is based largely on encryption algorithms.
This is key and I don’t think Signal shies away from this. You MUST trust the code you’re running. We know there are unofficial Signal builds. You must trust them. Why? Because think of it this way. You’re running a build of Signal, you type a messages. In code that text you type then gets run through Signal’s encryption. If you’re running a non-trustworthy build, they have access to the clear text before encryption, obviously. They can encrypt it twice, once with their key and once with yours, send it to a server, decrypt theirs and send yours on to it’s destination. (for example, there’s more ways than this).
The code can be okay but it’s delivery method(aka Google), the OS(aka Google) or the hardware can be compromised.
Just because it’s centralized doesn’t mean that it falls under this risk sector. Theoretically if the app was open sourced and was confirmed to not share your private key remotely on generation (or cross sign the key to allow a master key…), then the most the centralized server could know is your public key, the server wouldn’t have the ability to obtain the private key (which is what is needed to read the e2e encrypted messages)
This process would be repeated for the other party. The cool part of that system is you can still share your public keys via the centralized server, so you wouldn’t need to share the key externally. You just need to be able to confirm that the app itself doesn’t contain code to send your private key to the centralized server. Then checking integrity is as easy as messaging your friend to post what their public key is, and that public key would need to match the public key that the server is supplying as your contact.
The server can’t MiTM attack it because the server has no way of deciphering the message in the first place, so the most it could do is pass the message onto the proper party whom has the private key to be able to decrypt it.
Not that I have any other suggestions aside from signal though, there aren’t many centralized e2e chat services. Most use client to server encryption which would allow decryption server side.
Just because it’s centralized doesn’t mean that it falls under this risk sector.
The attack as described almost certainly involves the server sending a message to your client and then having the messages replicated via a side channel to Whatsapp without breaking E2E encryption (it could be adding them as a desktop client or adding them as a hidden participant in all chats, that isn’t clear in the article)
If you could run Whatsapp without connecting to Meta, you would be safe from this attack, but as you’ve pointed out a secure client is a better solution.
Fully agree that in this case if the claim is true (they have had a few of these claims), it’s likely whatsapp either making itself a companion app that’s hidden, or has some form of escrow in place to allow deciphering the messages. (Considering Messenger allows decrypting e2e chats with a 6 digit security pin, I’m leaning towards an escrow)
I was just mentioning that this isn’t a fault of it being centralized, this is a design choice by the company when implementing e2e encryption, and that a properly functioning system would never give the server the ability to decipher the messages in the first place.
Element / matrix.
With e2e you don’t need to trust the servers. You only need to trust the client that does the encryption.
Should you not also trust your device hardware, it’s os and the market you got the app from?
That’s a given I think. If you can’t trust the OS then you can’t trust the client.
The attack as described almost certainly involves the server sending a message to your client and then having the messages replicated via a side channel to Whatsapp without breaking E2E encryption.
But yes the point is you can’t trust the clients.
If you could run Whatsapp without connecting to Meta, you would be safe from this attack, but as you’ve pointed out a secure client is a better solution.
What is your alternative? Everybody codes their own app??
Also you’re unhinged in these comments
People should understand the limits of E2E encryption.
I’d rather be unhinged than wrong.
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Shocked, I tell you
Well if I can’t trust Meta with my information, who CAN I trust
Me
Oh okay. My location is 55.752121, 37.617664, my full name is Jeremy, and my password is hunter9. I trust you not to tell this to anybody
Hi Vova
Your full name is “Jeremy”?
Oh god damnit chemicalprofet why did you tell this guy i thougjt i could trust you :((
All I see is ‘••••••’
I see ‘******’ though.
Maybe it’s just a different interface.
Jeremy “Iks” Hunter IX
Edit: IX. Iks. I think we got it right now.
The Ninth
Pronounced “iks”
Just like Cher (which is short for Cheremy).
Your secret is safe with us and our 36,893 affiliates.
Legitimate interest, though 🤞
Nice to see the ancient lore alive.
Can confirm, chemicalprophet is the best password manager I’ve ever used.
Ah! You did your own research!
ta
The drunk dude that’s always sitting on the ground near the park entrance and sell weird tissue dolls with curly hairs is more trustworthy, I’d say.
The biggest news is that Slashdot is still alive.
+5 insightful
Assume the same for Telegram and pretty much any chat platform that controls your private keys.
Telegram doesnt even pretend to be end to end encrypted.
Telegram for iOS lets you create “secret chats” but as far as I know other platforms have eliminated that functionality at the request of governments. And I would assume Apple technically controls the keys on device.
iOS lets you create “secret chats”
How? Not natively unless I’m mistaken
Not natively that I know of, but Telegram for iOS has the option when looking at someone’s profile. However, the Windows client does not.
Ah I see your edit now, thanks (and see how it was assumed implied :) )
The telegram was clear as a day they announced cooperation with the Russian government and they unblocked it. That was way before the whole France fiasco, I doubt they’re actually giving up the keys to France. I’m from East and many say that Telegram now is essentially a Russian weapon. Surveillance at home, total free reign (sell drugs, spread CP, etc.) in west.
If you’re American, I believe Telegram is actually safer than Whatsapp, as long as you can ignore the dirty side of it (surface deep web?), hence why Europe wants it under control
Wait, you are telling me that the company whos entire business is collecting personal information, including people who don’t sign up for their services, to leverage for advertising, is keeping their platforms unsecured they can continually grab more information rather than secure it?
I for one am shocked, absolutely shocked.
Yes, except they’re not leveraging your data for advertising, they’re leveraging it so they can manipulate your political views and keep you from finding solidarity with other working people.
@FlyingCircus @technology These two things are the same thing
It is end to end encrypted but they can just pull the decrypted message from the app. This has been assumed for years, since they said they could parse messages for advertising purposes.
Surely they have access otherwise how do they moderate and investigate account blocks, reports of spam etc. Accounts get suspended, then some automation reviews it, then it escalates to a human, who will have to make a judgement based on some policy. How can they do that if they see nothing? (I’m asking not condoning).
it’s not even that: they just hold the keys so can simply decrypt your messages with out your clients intervention any time they like
Yep, If they can access messages that are deleted from your device, then they have the keys.
Hasn’t it always been that they can decrypt the backups that you personally setup in wa, this way they don’t legally lie to you when the app tells you “this chat is encrypted, even Whatsapp cannot read the messages”.
Yes, any time you can store and recover encrypted cloud archives across devices, without needing to transfer keys between devices, it implies that there is a key archive somewhere in the cloud. Even Signal struggles to get this both user friendly and properly secure without compromising forward secrecy. I believe they still actually make you explicitly do a local key transfer to populate a new device, even though they have cloud archives now. Whatsapp doesn’t do that. And the app also clearly leaks some amount of unencrypted data anyway, archives or not.
